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EUNOMICS AND JUSTICE
JOSEPH LAZAR*
F UNOMICS is "the science, theory, or study of good order and
-workable arrangements."' It fuses the values of law with the
empirical data and methods if the objective sciences. Accordingly,
justice-a primary value of law-is to be understood and attained
as a function of scientific data and methodology. If lawyers are
concerned with justice, they will find new understandings in tile
developments of eunomics. This essay demonstrates the inter-
relationship of justice and scientific method, and is an example of
the potential power of eunomics.
The particular area of justice dealt with here involves grievances
of individuals and non-represented unions (in contrast with griev-
ances submitted by unions with membership representation) on the
National Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division.
THE NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD,
FIRST DIVISION
This Board was created by Congress in 1984 "to provide for the
prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of griev-
ances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements
covering rates of pay, rules or working conditions."2  The First
Division of the Board has jurisdiction over disputes involving train
and yard service employees of carriers,3 and is composed of five
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DRailway Labor Act §3 First (i), 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §153 First (i)
(1952).
8 The Board as a whole is composed of 4 divisions whose proceedings are in-
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
carrier representatives and five representatives of "national-in-scope"
labor organizations. Decision is by majority vote. Should the bi"
partisan board deadlock, provision is made for appointment of a
neutral referee.
The Board has a history of predecessor agencies going back at
least to 1918. Until about 1946, only disputes appealed by one or
more of the "national-in-scope" or "regular" unions would be
docketed and decided by the Board. Grievances of individuals or of
"non-regular" or "outside" unions would not be handled. Since
1946, however, the Board has docketed and determined such
grievances.
In this brief description of the Board, it should be noted that
the Board's awards are "final and binding upon both parties to
the dispute, except insofar as they may contain a money award." 4
Of singular importance is the decision by the United States Supreme
Court in the Slocum case that there is "a denial of power in any
court-state as well as federal-to invade the jurisdiction conferred
on the adjustment board by the Railway Labor Act."5 As stated by
Mr. Justice Black: "We hold that the jurisdiction of the Board to
adjust grievances and disputes of the type here involved is ex-
clusive."6
This Slocum holding was in the teeth of Mr. Justice Reed's
documented and realistic dissent portraying the utter lack of due
process of law in the proceedings of the Board:
Congress surely would not have granted this exclusive primary power to
adjudicate contracts to a body like the Board. It consists of people
chosen and paid, not by the government, but by groups of carriers and
the large national unions. Congress has furnished few procedural safe-
guards. There is no process for compelling the attendance of witnesses
or the production of evidence. There is no official record, other than that
of the informal pleadings. Hearings are conducted without witnesses.
The Board has operated without giving individuals a chance to be heard
dependent of one another. Eighteen of its 36 members are selected by the carriers and
18 are selected by "national-in-scope" unions. Each member of the Board is com-
pensated by "the party or parties he is to represent." Other costs are borne by the
Federal government. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the Order of Railway
Conductors and Brakemen, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Fireman and Enginemen, and the Switchmen's Union of North America
each have one representative member on the 1st Division.
'Railway Labor Act § 3 First (m), 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (in)
(1952).
5 Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 244 (1950).
Old. at 244.
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unless they were represented by unions. The extent of judicial review
of awards other than money awards is doubtful, and it is highly question-
able whether even a money award can be reviewed in the courts if only
the carrier wishes review. Most important, the statute provides no
relief for a petitioning party-be he union, individual, or carrier-against
an erroneous award of the Board. This court may be hard put to protect
the rights of minorities under these circumstances.7
Thus it is apparent that individuals and outside unions have
no recourse or remedy for ordinary grievances against the carriers
other than through the machinery of the Board; that traditional safe-
guards of due process of law are lacking in the procedures of the
Board; and that the Board is bi-partisan in composition, without
representation of outside unions or individual claimants.
BEHAVIORAL SYSTEMS THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Conceptually, the Board may be viewed as a behavioral system
and as possessing the properties of such. In brief, a behavioral
system exists in space-time; has calculable boundaries; is made up
of parts or subsystems; has energy interchange, inputs and outputs,
crossing the boundaries between the system and its environment; has
energy interchange among its parts or subsystems; tends to maintain
a state of equilibrium internally amongst its subsystems; and tends
7Id. at 251-52. In support of his statements, Mr. Justice Reed cited: Railway Labor
Act § 3 First (a) (b) (c) (g) (m) (p), 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (a), (b), (c),
(g), (m), (p) (1952); Monograph of the Att'y Gen's Comm. on Administrative Procedure,
Part 4, Railway Labor, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-14 (1941); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 206 (1944); Shields v. Utah I. Cent. R.R., 305 U.S.
177 (1938); Edwards v. Capital Airlines, 176 F.2d 755, 759-60 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Washing-
ton Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1941), afj'd, 319 U.S. 732 (1942);
Howard v. Thompson, 72 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Mo. 1947); State ex tel. St. Louis-S.F. Ry.
v. Russell, 358 Mo. 1136, 219 S.W.2d 340 (1949); Garrison, The National Railroad
Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567, 576-81 (1937).
Other useful references on the Board include: LAZAR, DUE PROCESS ON THE RAILROADs
(Institute of Industrial Relations No. 1, 1950) (rev. ed. 1958); KALTENBORN, GOVERN-
MENTAL ADJUSTMENT or LABOR DISPUTES 37-72 (1943); KAUFMAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN THE UNITED STATES (1954); McNAUGHTON & LAZAR, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE
GOVERNMENT 95-138 (1954); SPENCER, THm NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
(University of Chicago Studies in Business Administration No. 3, 1958); Lazar, Tension
Reduction in the National Railroad Adjustment Board System, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
116 (Oct. 1962); Lazar, Eunomics: A Behavioral-Science View of the National Railroad
Adjustment Board, 1961 Dura L.J. 262; Lazar, The Human Sciences and Legal Institu-
tional Development: Role and Reference Group Concepts Related to the Development
of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 31 NoaR DAME LAw. 414 (1956);
Northrup & Kahn, Railroad Grievance Machinery: A Critical Analysis, 5 IND. & LAB.
REL. REV. 365 (1952); Comment, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 303 (1951); 51 YALE L.J. 666 (1942).
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to maintain a state of balance externally with its environment. 8
The Board, viewed as a behavioral system, exists in space-time;
has boundaries separating it from carriers, unions, courts, and other
institutions; is made up of its carrier and union parts or subsystems;
has input grievances and output awards crossing the boundaries be-
tween itself and the railroad and external environment; has inter-
action or energy interchange between its parts or subsystems in the
disposition of grievances and other matters; and copes with internal
and external stresses and tensions as it strives to maintain internal
equilibrium and external balance in processing the input grievances
into output awards.9
From general theoretical notions of behavioral systems theory,
it seemed that Board awards would tend to be made in the direction
of minimizing strain and promoting internal equilibrium and
external balance. Claims on the part of individuals, passing by or
rejecting the regular union representation, if sustained, would be
peculiarly stressful and strain producing to the regular union
representation. It was thought, moreover, that individual claims, if
sustained, would be strain producing to the carriers, at least
financially. Similar reasoning suggested that it would be strain
reducing to both union and carrier subsystems to have outside
union claims rejected, and that it would be strain increasing to
have them sustained.
From these theoretical bases, a number of hypotheses were made:
(a) It would be strain reducing on both the union and carrier
subsystems to have individual and outside union claims rejected.
(b) Disproportionately fewer individual and outside union
cases than regular cases would be deadlocked for referee disposition.
(c) Viewing the referee as a component subsystem of the Board,
there would be a tendency for the referee to minimize strain by
denying disproportionately more individual and outside union cases
than regular ones.
(d) Practical difficulties in achieving congruent and harmonious
8 Useful references on the theory include: Bertalanffy, Theoretical Models in Biology
and Psychology, 20 J. PERsONALrrY 1 (1951); Bertalanffy, The Theory of Open Systems
in Physics and Biology, 3 SCIENcE 25 (1950); Herbst, A Theory of Simple Behavioral
Systems, I, 14 HUMAN REI 71 (1961); Herbst, Situation Dynamics and the Theory of
Behavior Systems, 2 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 13 (1957); Miller, Toward a General Theory
for the Behavioral Sciences, 10 AM. PsYcHoLocisr 513 (1955).
9 The analogy is amplified in Lazar, Eunomics: A Behavioral Science View of the
National Railroad Adjustment Board System, 1961 DUKE L.J. 262.
awards within a precedential system respecting stare decisis would
create tensions and that such tensions would be reduced by dis-
missing, without substantive decision, disproportionately more in-
dividual and outside union cases than regular cases.
FINDINGS
A total of 180 cases involving individuals and outside unions have
been found through a check of the published awards of the Board.
Of the 180 cases, 53 involved "outside union" and 127 involved
"indhvidual" cases.10 This compares with approximately 8500 "regu-
lar" cases determined by the Board in the same period, June 1946-
June 1960. Tables 1 and 2 show the disposition of cases by the
Board.
TABLE 1
DisPosrnON OF CASES BY THE FIRST DivisON
Compro- sus-
Denied Dismissed mised tained Referred Total
Outside Union 49.0%( 26 ) 13.2%( 7) 5.7%( 3 ) 0%( 0 ) 32.1%( 17 ) 100%( 53 )
Individual 39.3%( 50 ) 45.7%( 58) 0.0%( 0 ) 0%( 0 ) 15.0%( 19 ) 100%( 127)
Regular 20.0%(1700") 6.0%(510") 1.0%(85") 3%(255-) 70.0%(5950") 100%(8500")
* Estimated. Services: Annual Reports, National Mediation Board. Also, published In-
dex, and reports by Association of Western Railroads.
TABLE: 2
DIsPOsrION OF CASES REFERR.ED TO REFEREE
Denied Dismissed Compromised Sustained Total
Outside Union 29.4%( 5 ) 52.9%( 9 ) 11.8%( 2 ) 5.9%( 1 ) 100%( 17)
Individual 89.4%( 17 ) 0.0%( 0 ) 5.3 ( 1 ) 5.3%( 1 ) 100%( 19 )
Regular 67.8%(3740*) 4.3%(255") 8.5%(510") 24.291445") 100%(5950")
* Estimated. Services: Annual Reports, National Mediation Board. Also published In-
dex, and reports by Association of Western Railroads.
"An "individual" case may involve one or more individual claimants; an "outside
union" is a union without representation on the union side of the First Division of
the Board. The individual and outside union awards are the following (asterisk* indi-
cates outside union case, no asterisk indicates individual case, R indicates Referee
decision, C indicates compromise decision, S indicates sustainal decision, and except for
sustainal and compromise notations, all are dismssed or denied cases): 117450, 14180,
14577R, 14635, 146900R, 14762"R, 14794, 14964"R, 15158, 15195, 152990R, 15413,
15497, 15888RC, 15898, 15981', 16145, 16271, 16273, 16277, 16281, 16426RS, 16478,
16479, 16548, 16563, 16593*, 16598, 16667, 16694', 16714, 16715, 16768, 16775, 167760,
16833, 16835, 16836, 16837, 16843, 16844, 16871, 16875, 16877, 16899, 16928, 16946,
17084, 17179, 17203, 17204, 17205, 17244, 17245, 17316, 17317, 17346, 17386, 17421,
17464, 17473, 17496R, 17574, 17598, 17623, 17639, 17654', 17679, 17698, 17699', 17721,
17737, 17757, 17765', 17766', 17767*, 17768*, 17769', 17777, 17805* 17806*, 178070,
17808", 17809', 178130, 17818, 17828, 17835, 17836, 17837, 17873, 17894, 17899, 17900,
17902, 17924, 17969, 17970, 17971, 17978, 18530, 18531, 18566, 18568, 185840C, 18604,
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All hypotheses were clearly confirmed. There was just one indi-
vidual case and just one outside union case sustained. Neither
sustainal was by the Board without referee. Fewer individual
(15%) and outside union (32%) cases were deadlocked than in
regular (70%) cases. Referees sustained fewer individual (5%)
and outside union (6%) cases than regular cases (24%). Without
referee, the Board dismissed individual (46%) and outside union
(13%) cases in greater proportion than regular cases (6%); and with
referee, the percentages for individual cases were (0%), outside
union (53%), and regular (4%).
Of special significance is the finding of only two (2) cases
sustained out of 180 individual and outside union awards.
Of course, the statistics do not tell us whether the particular
awards reached in the particular cases were just or unjust. Whether,
or to what extent, the disposition of the individual and outside union
cases reflects an inherent lack of merit in these cases, or reflects the
operation of the theorized behavioral'system tendency toward strain
reduction, is a troublesome but basic question. Competent and
knowledgeable persons, experts in the field, served as members of
the Board and presumably would not intentionally and deliberately
make erroneous and unjust awards. Especially might one assert
such a statement of the neutral referees on the Board.
In the judgment of this investigator, however, the grievances of
the individual and outside union employees were basically similar
to the regular cases in statement of claim, statement of facts, positions
of parties, and collective bargaining provisions relied upon. It is
interesting to note that in 28 cases, the claims were rejected to reach
results consistent with conclusions already in effect between the
duly authorized representative of the employees and the carriers;11
and that in 19 cases the Division found it advisable to word its
decisions so as to preclude precedential force in its awards.12
18609, 18630, 18636, 18670, 18711, 18754, 18766, 18798, 18820R, 18821R, 18822R, 18826,
18852, 18906, 18915, 18952, 18953, 18955, 18957, 18958, 19001, 19079*, 19275R, 192880RC,
19306, 19352, 19353, 19396', 19397', 19398', 19399', 194040R, 194050R, 19410, 19411,
194190R, 194200R, 19421*RC, 194220R, 19425, 19430, 19436, 194470R, 19485, 19508,
19534-R, 19576* , 19577-, 19578, 19579R, 19580R, 19581R, 19582R, 19583R, 19584R,
19585R, 19586R, 19587R, 19588R, 19589R, 196320, 19664, 19668R, 196850C, 19689, 19690,
19692, 19694, 19696*RS, 19727', 19728', 19845*R, 198870C.
12See Awards 15898, 16273, 16899, 16946, 17421, 17574, 17721, 17894, 18953, 16548,
16768, 17386, 17777, 17971, 18798, 18958, 19306, 19579, 19580, 19581, 19582, 19583, 19584,
19585, 19586, 19587, 19588, 19589.
"Thus, the Board held: "This award is not to be cited or used as a precedent in
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All things considered, including a generous allowance for possible
lack of merit in the cases, it appears to this investigator that the
results reached in the cases are to be attributed in significant degree
to the operation of the theorized behavioral system tendency toward
strain reduction. This tendency may operate in subtle ways, affect-
ing how the Board perceives facts and arguments in the particular
cases.13 Thus, where in a regular case the Board member may fail
to note or give weight to procedural defects, such defects loom large
and even fatal in the individual and outside union case. It is
consistent to state, therefore, that the results noted in Tables 1 and
2 can be questioned as to their intrinsic justice and that the members
of the Board, including referees, can be above question in their good
faith, dedicated performance of their roles.
JuSTICE THROUGH EQUILIBRIUM
Eunomics, it will be recalled, calls for a good or just ordering
of grievances within workable arrangements. In perspective, the
180 individual and outside union cases passed upon since 1946 are
less than 2% of the approximately 8,500 cases on the docket of the
Board, and the regular cases may be expected to be the bulk of the
docket in the future. The bi-partisan composition of the Board
tends towards equal tensions in the directions of sustainail awards
(on the part of the union sub-system) and denial awards (on the
part of of the carrier subsystem). It is thought that the tendency
toward equilibrium should be maintained for the regular docket.
A proper solution to the problem of justice for individuals and
outside unions should be reached without damaging the normal
procedures or structure of the Board.14
any other case." (16775). Awards Nos. 15898, 16563, 16593, 16667, 16714, 16715, 16776,
16843, 16875, 16877, 17765, 17766, 17768, 17813, 17899, 19397, 19576, 19577.
"'BLAKE & RAMSEY, PERCEPTION-AN APPROACH TO PERSONALITY (1951); KRECH &
CRUTcHFIELD, THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1954); Bruner & Goodman,
Value and Need as Organizing Factors in Perception, 42 J. AB. & Soc. PSYCH. 33
(1947); Bruner & Postman, Symbolic Value as an Organzing Factor in Perception, 27
J. Soc. PSYCH. 203 (1948); Lazar, The Human Sciences and Legal Institutional De-
velopment: Role and Reference Group Concepts Related to the Development of the
National Railroad Adjustment Board, 31 NOTRE DAME LAw. 414 (1956).
','The First Division of the Board, bi-partisan in composition, has historic con-
nection with the on-going industrial relations system of the nation's railroads. Con-
siderable caution, it is felt, must be exercised in effecting any changes likely to modify
the dynamic articulation of the Division with its traditional functions and relationships
in the industry. See, in this connection, LAzAR, Dtr PROCzSS ON THE RAILROAD (Insti-
tute of Industrial Relations No. 1, 1950); Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment
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The problem of accomplishing justice for individuals and outside
unions appears to arise by reason of the tendency of the Board system
as a whole, and of its component subsystems, to reach tension re-
duction or equilibrium through claim rejection. Unlike the regular
cases wherein it is strain reducing to reach sustainail awards by the
union subsystem, there would be increase in strain on the part of
the union subsystem (as well as carrier subsystem) by sustained
awards in favor of individuals and outside unions. These statements
appear to be valid in the light of the findings set forth above.
Let it be assumed that individual and outside union claims are
rejected in significant degree as a consequence of the presumed
tendency of behavioral systems toward equilibrium and strain
reduction. If it could be made strain reducing to uphold such
claims, then the defendant-carriers in such cases might be denied
justice, much as the claimants in the existing situation. Accord-
ingly, it would seem that equal and even-handed justice between
the parties is to be achieved within a system where it is equally
strain reducing to sustain a claim as it is strain reducing to reject a
claim. Justice is more likely to be attained under conditions of
equilibrium.
If it is true that justice is a function of conditions of equilibrium,
and if conditions of equilibrium can be measured through scientific
methodology, then it would seem to follow that linkages between
justice and science should be investigated by lawyers.
EUNOMICS
There are several possible kinds of action which might be under-
taken to modify the tendency toward strain reduction by rejection
of individual and outside union claims. One kind of action is
procedural. Another kind of action is organizational or structural
whereby the membership composition of the Board is changed.
Possible procedural changes might include the holding of
hearings before the Board, including the referee, so as to conform
more closely with traditional concepts of due process of law. Notice
requirements, opportunity to present evidence and argument, oppor-
tunity to cross-examine, power of subpoena, oath taking, official
Board, 46 YA.E L.J. 567 (1937); Lazar, The Human Sciences and Legal Institutional
Development: Role and Reference Group Concepts Related to the National Railroad
Adjustment Board, 31 NoTRE DAMS. LAw. 414, 430-58 (1956).
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stenographic records, observance of certain basic rules of evidence,
etc., might be brought into the procedures.
Procedural changes, however, would be determinative simply of
how the parties establish their case, and how the members of the
Board interact with the parties and amongst themselves in the
making of the record of the case. Increased opportunity for pro-
cedural rulings alone will not tend towards equilibrium or tension
reduction within or between the subsystems of the Board. Oppor-
tunity for procedural rule manipulation may serve only to provide
additional channels for relieving the underlying tensions. Thus,
where the system tension reduction is to be achieved by rejection
of individual and outside union claims, it is likely that procedural
changes may serve only as cloaks or window-dressing to conceal the
inherent bias of the system against such claims. It is interesting
to note that some 30% of outside union claims were dismissed and
that some 46% of individual claims were dismissed in comparison
with some 9% of regular cases dismissed.15 It would seem that
the constraints of procedure would not bar a hostile system from
deciding against a party on procedural grounds, especially where
any right of appeal is doubtful. In fact, a negative decision on
procedural grounds might even be encouraged.
If procedural changes does not supply the cure, it is clear that
organizational or structural changes to alter the composition of the
system are required. For so long as it is tension reducing for the sub-
systems of union and carrier to reject individual and outside union
claims, the tendency to make decisions of this sort may be expected
to continue. Consequently, it is necessary to remove such tendency
by eliminating or altering the composition of the subsystems.
One way of altering the subsystem composition is to add to the
membership of the Board, for the particular individual or outside
union case, a representative of such party. So long as the regular
membership functions within the Board, however, the outside party
is conclusively outvoted. It would be unrealistic to assume that
the tendencies toward strain reduction through rejection of such
cases would be eliminated by bringing the outsider into the system
membership, even if this were permissible.16
1r See Tables 1 and 2.
16 The fight-to-the-death struggle of the standard railroad labor organizations
represented on the First Division and the United Railroad Operating Crafts (UROC)
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In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is necessary to
consider the possibility of the reorganization of the Board system so
that the carrier and union subsystems may be outvoted or eliminated.
The first alternative would require the addition of eleven "public"
referees to outvote the ten regular members of the Division. Ob-
viously, this is not practicable. To eliminate the union and carrier
subsystems or to reduce their size and outweigh them by "public"
members is another possibility. Such a reorganization would run
counter to the effort to solve the problem without damaging the
system's handling of the great bulk of the docket of regular cases.
This suggests then that a special organizational provision is required
for the individual and outside union cases.
The discussion so far indicates that neither procedural nor
organizational changes so far considered within the existing Board
system offer an adequate solution to the problem presented. Con-
ceivably, if the exclusive jurisdiction holding in the Slocum case
were restricted in application to the regular cases, the problem might
be solved through the traditional availability of the judicial forum
to individual and outside union claimants.' If this approach were
followed, there still would remain the question whether individuals
in recent years, with the defeat of UROC indicates little likelihood of a co-option
solution. See Railway Labor Act § 3 First (c) (f), 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 155
First (c) (f) (1952), setting forth procedures for the selection of membership of the
Board. See also, Pigott v. Detroit, T. & I.R.R., 221 F.2d 736, cert. denied, 350
US. 833 (1955); United R.R. Operation Crafts v. Northern Pac. Ry., 208 F.2d 135
(9th Cir. 1953); Shiels v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 154 F. Supp. 917 (S.D. Ind. 1957), af'd,
254 F.2d 863 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 846 (1958); United R.R. Operating
Crafts v. Wyer, 115 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
It is of interest that the UROC submitted 16 cases to the First Division; and of these
16 cases, the Board without referee denied 14 outright and dismissed two. In 6 of
the 16 cases, the findings stated that the case "is not to be considered or cited as a
precedent" or words to this effect. See Awards Nos. 16593, 16714, 17757, 17765, 17766,
17767, 17768, 17769, 17805, 17805, 17807, 17808, 17809, 17813, 17927, 17928.
.7 In Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 244 n.7 (1949), the Court stated:
"We are not confronted here with any disagreement or conflict in interest between
an employee and his bargaining representative, as in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944). Nor are we called upon to decide any question concerning
judicial proceedings to review board action or inaction." Accordingly, it would
appear that an employee in disagreement or with conflict in interest with his bargaining
representative, as in Steele, may seek his remedy in court. Even if this category of
cases were expanded and not narrowly construed so as to broaden out the availability
of the judicial forum, it is doubtful, on the basis of the nature of the claims actually
submitted to the First Division, whether there would be any substantial number of
cases within the jurisdiction of the courts. Almost all of the 180 individual and outside
union cases deal with conventional grievances involving discipline and application
of working rules.
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and outside unions were to be denied the real or fanciful advantages
in grievance determination made available to the regular unions.
It seems that a full and adequate solution to the problem is
readily available by simple action of the First Division. Section
3 First (w) of the Railway Labor Act provides, in part, that "any
division of the Adjustment Board shall have authority, in its dis-
cretion, to establish regional adjustment boards to act in its place
and stead for such limited period as such division may determine
to be necessary."' 8  This provision of the Act has previously been
the basis for the creation of supplemental boards, national in scope,
by the First Division. 19 Accordingly, it is within the present legal
authority of the First Division to establish supplementary boards to
issue awards on cases of individuals and outside unions. Such boards
may be specially created from time to time as the size of the docket
of individual and outside union cases may warrant.
The membership of the supplementary boards may be representa-
tive of the carriers and the individuals and outside unions who are
parties to the cases. The First Division may, and has made, such
designation pursuant to section 3 First (w) which provides in part:
Carrier members of such regional boards shall be designated in keeping
with rules devised for this purpose by the carrier members of the Adjust-
ment Board and the labor members shall be designated in keeping with
rules devised for this purpose by the labor members of the Adjustment
Board.20
It is within the power of the First Division to limit the prece-
dential force of the supplementary board.2' Thus, if it chooses to
do so, it may provide that awards of the supplementary board are
to have no value whatsoever as precedents and are not to be cited or
18 Railway Labor Act § 3 First (w); 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (w)
(1952).
10 See 16 NATIONAL MEDIATION BD. CHm. REP. 90 (1950).2 0 Railway Labor Act § 3 First (w), 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (w)
(1952). Party representatives were brought into the membership of the supplementary
boards previously established by the First Division.
21 Railway Labor Act § 3 First (w), 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (w)
(1952) provides in part: "Any such regional board shall, during the time for which it is
appointed, have the same authority to conduct hearings, make findings upon disputes
and adopt the same procedure as the division of the Adjustment Board appointing it,
and its decisions shall be enforceable to the same extent and under the same processes."
Although this provision would place the authority of the supplementary board on an
equal level with the parent sister First Division, the First Division is free by its own
action upon itself to establish the rule that supplementary board awards are to have no
precedent value on the First Division.
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used or considered as precedents on the First Division. In this
manner, the industrial jurisprudence of the regular First Division
system may be safeguarded and insulated from possibly mischievous
or collusive awards.22 A supplementary board, moreover, may be
able to function without making burdensome time and cost demands
on the regular membership of the First Division.
CONCLUSION
It appears that the bi-partisan compositon of the National Rail-
road Adjustment Board, First Division, has certain characteristic
properties of behavioral systems. It has a tendency towards max-
imizing strain reduction and reaching equilibrium. Where indi-
vidual and outside union grievances are inputs into the Board
system, tensions are created. The tensions seem to be reduced and
equilibrum seems to be restored, through rejection of the claims.
Thus, of 180 such claims found, only 2 were sustained.
Justice, it seems, is more likely to be attained where conditions
of equilibrium exist, so that it is equally tension reducing to sustain
a claim as it is to deny a claim.
Eunomics, as the science, theory, or study of good order and
workable arrangements, suggests that the relationship between
justice and institutional tensions be systematically investigated. In
view of the factual findings indicated herein, it appears to be
desirable in the interests of justice to establish supplementary boards
of adjustment, pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, for the deter-
mination of grievances of individual and outside union cases.
" See, in this connection, Transcontinental & W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S.
653, 661 (1953), noting that if a court "must consider some provisions of a collective.
bargaining agreement, its interpretation would of course have no binding effect on
future interpretations by the Board."
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